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DEEP DANGER: INTENSIFIED COMPETITION IN
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
CHINA
Guifang (Julia) Xue*

I. INTRODUCTION
The South China Sea (SCS) has long been regarded as a major
source of tension and instability in the region. Over the years, numerous
attempts to manage the SCS, prevent regional confrontation, and foster
cooperation among concerned states have been recorded, but no
promising results have been observed. Since 2009, an upsurge in tension
has sparked concern that the area may become a flashpoint with the
potential for global consequences.1
This Article examines the underlying issues surrounding the
intensified competition in the SCS, and analyzes the implications of the
ongoing tension for Chinese interests in the region. Part II explains the
significance of the SCS’s natural resources, strategic position, and
international navigation routes, while also providing a portrait of the
competing claims to SCS resources. Part III illustrates the intensified
competition triggered by the continental shelf submissions of some
claimants, unilateral actions, maritime conflicts in disputed areas, and the
involvement of non-regional states. Part IV conducts a preliminary
examination of the legal value of China’s maritime boundary—
commonly referred to as the U-Shaped Line—based on its evolution and
* Director, Institute for the Law of the Sea, Ocean University of China.
A version of this paper was originally presented at the University of Alberta as
part of the Canada, US and China: Maritime Security Issues: The Arctic and the South
China Sea—Sharpened Competition or Collaboration? Conference, held on September
22-23, 2011.
1. See, e.g., THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: COOPERATION FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP (Tran Truong Thuy ed.,
2010) [hereinafter SOUTH CHINA SEA], available at http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/ datbaseon-south-china-sea-study/doc_details/36-the-south-china-sea-cooperation-for-regionalsecurity-and-development.
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Chinese legislation. Finally, Part V concludes that as the largest state
bordering the SCS, and core party to the dispute, it is vital for China to
define its claims based on international law, by bringing its claims into
conformity with the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in order
to serve its long term national interests.
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCS AND MARITIME DISPUTES
A. Features of the SCS
The SCS is a large semi-enclosed marginal ocean basin with a total
area of 3.5 million square kilometers and an average depth of over 2000
meters.2 The SCS contains four archipelagoes: the Dongsha Islands
(Pratas), Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank), Xisha Islands
3
(Paracels), and Nansha Islands (Spratlys).
The SCS is boarded by the East China Sea to the northeast, the
Pacific Ocean and Sulu Sea to the east, and the Java Sea and Indian
Ocean to the southwest. Lying between the Pacific and Indian Oceans,
the SCS serves the function of a “maritime super highway” and “vital
international passage.”4 The SCS is “one of the world’s most important
and densely used straights for international navigation.”5
The states bordering the SCS vary greatly in size, geography, social
and cultural structures, and economic and political systems.6 Many of
the states have contested claims to different parts of the SCS, particularly
islands.7 Of the disputed claims, the status of the Spratlys has been the
most contentious and has resulted in several military clashes in the past
forty years, particularly between China and Vietnam.8 The international
2. South
China
Sea,
CHINA
OCEANIC
INFO.
NETWORK,
http://www.coi.gov.cn/scs/introduction/gaikuang.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
3. Mark J. Valencia, The South China Sea: Prospects for Marine Regionalism, 2
MARINE POL’Y 87, 88 (1978).
4. David Rosenberg, Why a South China Sea Website?, SOUTH CHINA SEA,
http://www.southchinasea.org/why-a-south-china-sea-website-an-introductory-essay (last
visited Feb. 23, 2012).
5. See Choon-ho Park, EAST ASIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 283-84 (1983).
6. Besides China, countries bordering the SCS include: Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia,
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Laos, and Indonesia.
See generally Valencia, supra note 3, at 87.
7. See Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Rethinking the Interplay
of Law, Diplomacy, and Geo-Politics in the South China Sea, 13 INT’L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. 193, 195 (1998).
8. See Choon-ho Park, The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and
the Natural Resources?, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 27, 30 (1978) (discussing disputes

2012]

Deep Danger

309

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime has intensified these claims,
making the disputes, and therefore the solutions, more complex and
9
demanding.
Bordered by the world’s rapidly industrializing countries and
growing economies, the SCS also functions as a central component of the
Southeast Asian and world economies.10 The SCS natural resources are
of significance both globally and worldwide.11 Accordingly, ongoing
disputes and competition over resources in the SCS have attracted global
attention in the past decades.12
Because the SCS extends across tropical and semi-tropical zones
with a typical monsoon climate, the SCS has a large and complex marine
ecosystem and an abundant variety of resources.13 This has attracted
coastal states to develop fisheries industries.14 Among coastal states
bordering the SCS, China harvests the largest quantity of fish.15 Because
of the population of its coastal provinces, the fishing grounds of the SCS
are an important part of China’s fisheries.16
17
The abundance of vital
The SCS is also rich in oil and gas.
resources is one of the most important considerations sparking the
territorial disputes.18 The intensified competition for SCS resources has
seen a rise in the number of disputes.19 These disputes, mixed with

over the Spratly Islands); see also GREG AUSTIN, CHINA'S OCEAN FRONTIER:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, MILITARY FORCE AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 131-61 (1998)
(discussing China’s claims in the SCS).
9. See Joyner, supra note 7, at 194.
10. See Energy Info. Admin., Country Analysis Briefs: South China Sea, ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/South_China_Sea/pdf.pdf (last updated
Mar. 11, 2008).
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., Zhiguo Gao, The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation? 25
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 345, 345 (1994). See also JI GUOXING, MARITIME JURISDICTION
IN THE THREE CHINA SEAS: OPTIONS FOR EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT 3-29 (2005), available
at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7rq2b069.
13. Joyner, supra note 7, at 194; see also Park, supra note 9, at 37.
14. See GUIFANG XUE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES LAW AND POLICY, 207-8
(2005).
15. See SHIFU XIA ET AL., CHINA FISHERY DIVISIONS: A SURVEY AND DIVISION ON
CHINA'S FISHERY RESOURCES 166-71 (1982) (providing an overview of China’s fishing
grounds in the SCS).
16. Id.
17. See Energy Info. Admin., supra note 10.
18. See GAO, supra note 12, at 349.
19. Park, supra note 8, at 37.
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overlapping territorial claims, have resulted in numerous clashes.20
These clashes often result in the loss of property and life.21 As a
consequence, the SCS has become a site of tension with the potential for
greater conflict. This has made access to SCS waters problematic and
dangerous.
B. Maritime Disputes in the SCS
Over the decades, the SCS has drawn global attention not only for its
strategic location, resource competition, and security considerations, but
also for its multiple sovereignty and maritime jurisdictional disputes.
Until 1958, there were no sovereignty disputes in the SCS.22 Since
the 1960s, with the creation of an international law of the sea regime by
four Geneva Conventions, disputes over insular features started to
emerge, causing stress between relevant states.23 When UNCLOS’s
negotiation began in the 1970s, it increased these stresses, and some SCS
states started to make claims and take unilateral actions to control the
features near their coast.24 Since the 1970s, China’s maritime neighbors
have taken control over some of the Spratlys features.25 When UNCLOS
was signed in 1982 and entered into force in 1994, SCS disputes were
26
irrevocably intensified.
Six claims are presently asserted to the SCS islands or waters. China
and Taiwan both claim sovereignty over the four groups of insular
features—an area enclosed by a U-Shaped Line based on discovery,
historical usage, and effective occupation and control.27 China controls
20. See, e.g., Daojiong Zha, China's Exploitation of South China Sea Resources: The
Case of Hainan Province (IUJ Research Institute Working Paper: Asia Pacific Series No.
15, 2000), available at http://www.iuj.ac.jp/research/workingpapers/PIRS_2000_03.html.
21. See generally Nguyen Hong Thao, Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South
China Sea, 32 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 105 (2001).
22. See generally MARWYN S. SAMUELS, CONTEST FOR THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (1982)
(discussing the evolution of the SCS disputes).
23. See U.N., NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE
SEA, ST/LEG/SER.B/18 (1980).
24. See SAMUELS, supra note 22, at 75-93.
25. See MARK J. VALENCIA, JON M. VAN DYKE, & NOEL A. LUDWIG, SHARING THE
RESOURCES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 17-40 (1997) [hereinafter SHARING THE
RESOURCES].
26. Id.; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
27. Jurisprudential Evidence to Support China's Sovereignty Over the Nansha
Islands, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Nov. 17, 2000),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3754/t19234.htm 2000.
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28
Taiwan controls the
the Paracels and seven features of the Spratlys.
Pratas, the largest archipelago in the SCS, and Taiping Island (Itu Aba),
29
The Chinese claims have been
the largest island in the Spratlys.
challenged by other SCS coastal states making similar claims based on
30
EEZ and continental shelf principles established by UNCLOS.
Far more prominent has been the long-simmering dispute between
China and Vietnam over both the Paracels (Hoang Sa in Vietnamese) and
Spratlys (Truong Sa in Vietnamese).31 Vietnam claims that it discovered
and has actively ruled over both since the seventeenth century, and
currently controls twenty-one features of the latter.32 Vietnam hotly
disputes China's historical account, and insists that China never claimed
sovereignty over the islands until the 1940s, although it officially
recognized the sovereignty claim to the four SCS archipelagos by the
33
Chinese government in 1958.
The Philippines maintains separate claims to a portion of the Spratlys
and controls eight of them, known as the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG),
based on discovery, occupation, and geo-proximity.34 Malaysia lays its
claim over certain parts of the Spratly islands and reefs also on geoproximity and controls eight islands that they fall within their continental
shelf.35 Brunei claims two reefs and a maritime zone based on natural
prolongation of its continental shelf.36
Among the numerous territorial disputes, the Spratlys dispute is
probably the most serious to date. The Spratlys are a group of small
islands, reefs and atolls, cays, shoals, and sandbars in the SCS believed
to be sitting atop vast oil and gas reserves.37 These disputes mainly

28. The seven features are: Chigua Jiao (Johnson Reef), Huanyang Jiao (Cuarteron
Reef), Yongshu Jiao (Fiery Cross Reef), Zhubi Jiao (Subi Reef), Meiji Jiao (Mischief
Reef), Dongmen Jiao (Hughes Reef), and Nanxun Jiao (Gaven Reef). Wendy N. Duong,
Following the Path of Oil: The Law of the Sea or Realpolitik—What Good Does Law Do
in the South China Sea Territorial Conflicts?, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1098, 1148 (2007).
29. Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute: What Role for Normalizing
Relations Between China and Taiwan?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 819, 835 (1998).
30. Duong, supra note 28, at 1115.
31. See HAN ZHENHUA, COLLECTIONS OF THE INVESTIGATION ON HISTORICAL AND
GEOGRAPHICAL DOCUMENTATIONS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISLANDS 182 (1981).
32. See SHARING THE RESOURCES, supra note 25, at 20-29.
33. See Richard D. Beller, Note, Analyzing the Relationship Between International
Law and International Politics in China's and Vietnam's Territorial Dispute Over the
Spratly Islands, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 293, 309 (1994).
34. See SHARING THE RESOURCES, supra note 25, at 34.
35. Id. at 36.
36. Id. at 38.
37. Duong, supra note 28, at 1102.
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concern the ownership of some mid-ocean islets of the Spratlys, most of
which are reefs without much value in themselves, but the owner of the
Spratlys islets will be entitled to sovereign rights in a number of
maritime zones, and natural resources may be developed from the
38
offshore waters of the islets. None of these islets had been inhabited
historically, but in the recent half century the competing claimants,
except Brunei, have built up structures and garrisoned most of their
controlling features.39 Another appealing feature of ownership over the
Spratleys is the sea lane between the archipelagoes is the major route that
links East Asia with Africa and Europe.40
The fact that the competing claims of several states overlap makes
the situation more difficult than relatively simple bilateral disputes. The
issue is further complicated by the expansion of the dispute in recent
years to include boundary delimitation, entitlement of islands and rocks,
navigational freedoms, and military activities involving states from
outside the region.41 Besides a host of disputes and competition, the SCS
is presently facing problems of security challenges and dreadful
conditions of state relations. It is difficult to reach any consensus with
such a complex situation. Accordingly, no conclusive answer readily
available.
III. INTENSIFIED COMPETITION OVER THE SCS DISPUTES
The SCS claimants can rarely find agreement on any issue relating to
the archipelagos, especially in the latter half of the past century.
Negotiations remain deadlocked due to divergent views in their claims,
including what to call the disputed islets.42 Despite little progress in
resolving contradictory claims, the regional seascape has witnessed
43
Competition has
several additional features since the new century.
been intensified due to a number of factors including the various
submissions of claims to the outer limit of the continental shelf, the
resulting barrage of protests and assertions via diplomatic notes,
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1138.
40. Id. at 1105.
41. See generally id. at 1122.
42. For general information on the national interests of states bordering the SCS, see
generally BOB CATLEY & MARKMUR KELIAT, SPRATLYS: THE DISPUTE IN THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA (1997).
43. Nguyen Hong Thao, South China Sea—Three Stages, Four Challenges, Two
Regional Approaches and One Belief, in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: TOWARDS A REGION OF
PEACE, SECURITY AND COOPERATION 269 (Tran Truong Thuy ed., 2011).
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unilateral enforcement actions resulting in at-sea conflicts, and the
involvement of non-regional states putting extra pressure on international
44
All these factors have adversely affected the operating
relations.
system for dispute settlement. Therefore, a description of the various
forms of ongoing competition follows.
A. War of Diplomatic Notes Triggered by Extended
Continental Shelf Submissions
The key impetus for the seascape change in the SCS was the final
rush towards the May 13, 2009 deadline for the submission of claims to
an extended continental shelf (ECS) to the United Nation’s Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).45 On April 8, 2009, the
Philippines made the first submission among the SCS claimants to the
46
47
CLCS. The Philippine claim concerned the Benham Rise region.
Next, on May 6, 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam submitted a joint proposal
48
concerning the southern part of the SCS. The next day, Vietnam also
lodged a submission in the area north of that covered by its joint
submission with Malaysia.49 Unlike the Philippine submission, the
Malaysian and Vietnamese submissions immediately attracted the
attention of China and aroused a sequence of protests in the form of note

44. See supra Parts I, II.
45. This deadline was set according to article 4 of Annex II of UNCLOS and a
Decision adopted by the Meeting of States Parties (SPLOS/72). Oceans & Law of the
Sea, U.N., Issues With Respect to Article 4 of Annex II to the Convention (Ten-year
Time
Limit
for
Submissions),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
issues_ten_years.htm (last visited May 5, 2012).
46. U.N. Secretary-General, Receipt of the Submission Made by the Republic of the
Philippines to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. 09/132
(Apr. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_phl_22_2009.htm.
47. Id.
48. See U.N., Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer
Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines:
Submissions to the Commission: Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam (May 6, 2009), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm [hereinafter Joint Submission].
49. See SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET., SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS
OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 76, PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF SEA 1982: PARTIAL SUBMISSION IN RESPECT OF
VIETNAM’S EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF: NORTH AREA (VNM-N) (2009), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/vnm2009n_executiv
esummary.pdf.

314

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:2

verbales contesting the various claims.50 As a result, numerous
assertions, responses, and protests from nations throughout the SCS
51
ensued in the form of diplomatic notes.
On May 7, 2009, China strongly objected to the Malaysian and
52
Vietnamese submissions by submitting two note verbales to the CLCS.
China asserted that it possessed “indisputable sovereignty over the
islands in the [SCS] and the adjacent waters, and enjoy[ed] sovereign
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and
subsoil.”53 Further, China claimed that the Malaysian and Vietnamese
submissions “seriously infringed [on] China’s sovereignty, sovereign
rights and jurisdiction in the [SCS],” and requested that the CLCS not
consider the two submissions.54
The Philippines had a similar reaction as China to the Malaysian and
55
Vietnamese submissions. On August 4, 2009, the Philippines filed two
note verbales with the CLCS to protest the submissions.56 The
Philippines stated that both submissions “la[id] claim on areas that are
57
disputed . . . because they overlap with [those] of the Philippines.” The
Philippines also mentioned its historical claim to North Borneo (the
present day East Malaysian State of Sabah).58
It is worth mentioning that, with the two May 7, 2009 notes, China
attached its U-Shaped Line map to specify the boundary of its claim in
50. See Robert C. Beckman & Tara Davenport, CLCS Submissions and Claims in the
South China Sea, EAST SEA (SOUTH CHINA SEA) STUDIES (Aug. 16, 2010),
http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-internationalworkshop/608-clcs-submissions-and-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-by-robert-c-beckmana-tara-davenport.
51. Id.
52. See People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/17/2009 (May 7, 2009)
[hereinafter CML/17/2009], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf; People’s Republic of
China, Note Verbale CML/18/2009 (May 7, 2009) [hereinafter CML/18/2009], available
at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009
re_vnm.pdf.
53. See CML/17/2009, supra note 52, ¶ 2; CML/18/2009, supra note 52, ¶ 2.
54. See CML/17/2009, supra note 52, ¶ 3; CML/18/2009, supra note 52, ¶ 3.
55. See Republic of Philippines, Note Verbale 000819 (Aug. 4, 2009) [hereinafter
Note 000819], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
mysvnm33_09/clcs_33_2009_los_phl.pdf, and Republic of Philippines, Note Verbale
[hereinafter Note 000818], available at
000818 (Aug. 4, 2009)
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_re_phl_200
9re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.
56. Note 000819, supra 55, ¶ 2; Note 000818, supra note 55, ¶ 2.
57. Note 000819, supra 55, ¶ 2; Note 000818, supra note 55, ¶ 2.
58. Note 000819, supra note 55, ¶ 2.
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59
These two Chinese notes—and particularly the attached
the SCS.
60
map—have generated additional concerns and protests. Claimants
(such as Vietnam and Malaysia) and non-claimants (such as Indonesia)
have filed diplomatic notes to protest China’s claims.61
Vietnam quickly rejected China’s claim via a note verbale submitted
62
to CLCS on May 8, 2009, in response to China’s May 7, 2009 note. In
defending its earlier submissions as “legitimate undertakings,” Vietnam
reaffirmed its claim concerning its “indisputable sovereignty” over the
Paracels and Spratlys archipelagoes.63 Vietnam further declared that
“China’s claim over the islands and adjacent waters in the Eastern Sea
(South China Sea) as manifested in the map . . . has no legal, historical or
factual basis.”64
Vietnam also responded to the Philippine notes in its August 18,
65
Vietnam stated that its submissions were “legitimate
2009 note.
undertakings” consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS and made
without prejudice to boundary delimitations with relevant States.66 It
also took the “opportunity to reaffirm its consistent position that Viet
Nam has indisputable sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys
archipelagoes.”67
On May 20, 2009, Malaysia submitted a note verbale in response to
68
China’s note. The Malaysian note stated that its joint submission was a
legitimate undertaking and was made without prejudice to boundary
69
Furthermore,
delimitations or the positions of maritime disputes.
Malaysia noted that it had informed “China of its position prior to the

59. CML/17/2009, supra note 52; CML/18/2009, supra note 52.
60. See Tessa Jamandre, China Accuses PH of “Invasion,” ABS-CBN NEWS (Apr. 19,
2011, 11:10 PM), http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/04/19/11/china-accuses-ph%E2%80%98invasion%E2%80%99.
61. Beckman & Davenport, supra note 50.
62. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Note Verbale No. 86/HC-2009 (May 8, 2009),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_chn_2009r
e_mys_vnm_e.pdf [hereinafter 86/HC-2009].
63. Id. ¶ 3.
64. Id.
65. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Note Verbale No. 240 HC-2009 (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_re_phl_20
09re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.
66. See id. ¶¶ 2-3.
67. Id. ¶ 4.
68. Malaysia,
Note
Verbale
HA
24/09
(May
20,
2009),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mys_re_chn_20
09re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.
69. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
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submission,” but did not mention if China had been invited to join the
70
joint submission.
On August 21, 2009, Malaysia also filed a note verbale in response
the Philippines’ note.71 In addition to stating that its undertakings were
legitimate, Malaysia pointed out that it had informed the Philippines of
its position prior to the joint submission, and that both Vietnam and
Malaysia had proposed that the Philippines join them in that
72
submission. Malaysia also firmly denied the Philippines’ claim to
North Borneo.73
Although Indonesia is not an SCS claimant, on July 8, 2010, it
submitted a note verbale to the CLCS expressing its concerns about
China’s U-Shaped Line.74 The note questioned the map’s consistency
with international law, specifically attacking its “legal basis, the method
75
The
of drawing, and the status of th[e] separated dotted-lines.”
Indonesian note also expressed concern as to whether China would adopt
the same position it openly expressed regarding the Okinitorishima rocks
to the other small insular features in SCS.76 Indonesia stated that the
“remote or very small features in the South China Sea do not deserve
exclusive economic zones or continentals shelf of their own.”77
Indonesia argued that allowing these small features to generate such
zones would “concern[] the fundamental principles of the Convention
and encroach[] on the legitimate interest of the global community.”78
Almost ten months after the Indonesian note, the Philippines filed a
79
note verbale with the CLCS protesting China’s U-Shaped Line. This
protest was lodged on April 5, 2011, nearly two years after China
80
Additionally—and more
submitted its map to the CLCS.
70. Id. ¶ 4.
(Aug.
21,
2009),
71. Malaysia,
Note
Verbale
HA
41/09
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mys_re_phl_20
09re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.
72. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.
73. Id. ¶ 5.
74. Republic of Indonesia, Note Verbale No. 480/POL-703/VII/10 (July 8, 2010),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_my
s_vnm_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
75. Id. ¶ 2.
76. Id. ¶ 2-3.
77. Id. ¶ 3.
78. Id.
79. Republic of the Philippines, Note Verbale 000228 (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/phl_re_chn_201
1.pdf [hereinafter Note 000228].
80. Id. Cf. CML/17/2009, supra note 52.
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importantly—this note relates to a much earlier argument between the
81
two.
In February 2009, China and the Philippines sparred over the
sovereignty and jurisdiction over Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal,
also referred to as Bajo de Masinloc by the Philippines) as well as some
islands and submerged reefs of the KIG in the SCS.82 Tensions rose
when the Philippines enacted its Archipelagic Baseline Act,83 on March
11, 2009, which amended its baselines law to prepare for its partial ECS
84
The Act claims an island regime under the UNCLOS
submission.
article 121 for the KIG.85
The Archipelagic Baseline Act was vigorously protested by China’s
86
note verbale of April 13, 2009. China argued that, “Huangyan Island
and Nansha Islands have been part of the territory of China since ancient
time,” and that China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands and
the surrounding areas.87
Instead of immediately replying, the Philippines postponed its
88
response for two years. On April 5, 2011, the Philippines submitted a
note verbale to protest China’s claim.89 The note is quite lengthy for its
nature, and confronts China’s claim to the SCS islands and other
geological features, as well as their adjacent waters, seabed, and
subsoil.90 Among their challenges, the Philippines made it clear that KIG
“constitutes an integral part of the Philippines,” and that the Philippines
91
has “sovereignty and jurisdiction over . . . [KIG’s] geological features.”
The Philippines also argued that it exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction
over the waters adjacent to each geological feature in the KIG under
81. Id.
82. See Henry Goa, Sino-Philippines Dispute (Not Trade-Related), WTO AND CHINA
(Feb. 21, 2009, 11:24AM), http://wtoandchina.blogspot.com/2009/02/sino-philippinesdispute-not-trade.html.
83. An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by
Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and for
Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 9522, (Mar. 11, 2009) (Phil.), available at
http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_14/RA09522.pdf.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 2; UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 121, at 578.
86. People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/12/2009 (Apr. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/communi
cationsredeposit/mzn69_2009_chn.pdf.
87. Id. ¶ 2.
88. Note 000228, supra note 79.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. ¶ 3.
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92
UNCLOS’s principle that the land dominates the sea. The Philippines
argued that this principal applied to “the extent [that] the waters that are
‘adjacent’ to the relevant geological features [if they] are definite and
determinable under UNCLOS, specifically under Article 121 (Regime of
93
Islands) of the said Convention.” The Philippines argued that because
waters adjacent to the geological features in the KIG are definite and
subject to legal and technical measurement, China's claims “on the
relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil” outside of the
geological features have “no basis under international law, specifically
UNCLOS.”94
China promptly replied to this protest on April 14, 2011 by
95
submitting a note verbale to the CLCS. In the note, China branded the
contents of the Philippine note as “totally unacceptable” to China’s
“indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the
adjacent water.”96 Moreover, China claimed that “since the 1970s, the
Philippines has invade[d] and occup[ied] some islands and reefs of
China’s Nansha Islands and made relevant territorial claims, to which
China objects strongly.”97 China went further, stressing that under
UNCLOS, “China’s Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea,
98
[EEZ] and Continental Shelf.”
In addition to asserting sovereignty and jurisdiction in the SCS,
China also contended that in the “series of international treaties which
define the limits of the territory of the Republic of Philippines and the
domestic legislation of the Republic of Philippines prior to 1970s. . . .
[the] Philippines had never made any claims to Nansha Islands or any of
its components.”99 China also clarified that “[t]he so-called [KIG]
claimed by the Republic of Philippines is in fact part of China’s Nansha
Islands,” and that this fact has been “given publicity” since the 1930s.100
Refuting the Philippines’s assertion of sovereignty and jurisdiction
over the waters adjacent to the relevant features of the KIG, China stated

92. Shi Jiuyong, Maritime Delimitation in the Jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice, 9 CHINESE J. OF INT. L. 271, 275 (2010).
93. Note Verbale 000228, supra note 79, at ¶¶ 4-5.
94. Id. ¶ 6.
95. People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/8/2011 (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_p
hl_e.pdf [hereinafter Note Verabale CML/8/2011].
96. Id. ¶ 2.
97. Id. ¶ 3.
98. Id. ¶ 4.
99. Id. ¶ 3.
100. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
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that the Philippines cannot, “[u]nder the legal doctrine of ‘ex injuria jus
101
. . . , invoke such [an] illegal occupation to support its
non oritur’
territorial claims.”102 China asserted that by virtue of “the legal principle
of ‘la terre domine la mer,’103 coastal states’ [EEZ] and Continental
Shelf claims shall not infringe upon the territorial sovereignty of other
104
In addition, China argued that under UNCLOS, as well as
States.”
China’s domestic laws, “China’s Nansha Islands is [sic] fully entitled to
105
Territorial Sea, [EEZ] and Continental Shelf.”
This exchange between China and the Philippines regarding SCS
islands generated a subsequent reaction from Vietnam.106 Vietnam
submitted a new note on May 3, 2011 in response to Philippine Note No.
107
000228 and Chinese Note CML/8/2011. The Vietnamese note did not
raise any new issues, but simply reiterated Vietnam’s claims to the
108
Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes in identical language.
In summation, the submissions for an ECS in the disputed areas of
the SCS have caused a series of strong protests through the exchange of
diplomatic notes. According to the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission, the CLCS is not likely to consider either the joint
submission of Malaysia and Vietnam or the submission of Vietnam.109
“While the submissions and accompanying objections are very complex,
the practical effect of these submissions has the potential to have a
significant impact on the South China Sea disputes.”110 The diplomatic
notes submitted to the CLCS not only function as assertive actions to
form the legal basis for the states’ respective positions, but also result “in
several of the claimants bringing their claims into conformity with their
111
However, the war of
rights and obligations under UNCLOS.”
diplomatic notes also reveals the complexity of the SCS disputes and the
difficulties in addressing them.
101. “Law does not arise from injustice.”
102. Id. ¶ 3.
103. “The land dominates the sea.”
104. Id.
105. Id. ¶ 4.
106. Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Note Verbale FF/HC-2011 (May 3, 2011),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_2011_re_p
hlchn.pdf.
107. Id.
108. Id. ¶ 2.
109. Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Annex I 5(a), U.N. Doc. CLCS/40/Rev. 1 (Apr. 17, 2008).
110. Robert Beckman, South China Sea: Worsening Dispute or Growing Clarity in
Claims?, RSIS COMMENT., Aug. 16, 2010, at 1, 1.
111. Beckman & Davenport, supra note 50.
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B. “Heavy Smoke” Caused by Unilateral Actions and At-Sea Conflicts
In addition to diplomatic protests, the SCS has seen an increase in
the number of unilateral actions and maritime conflicts; all the SCS
claimants have endeavored to build up naval capabilities and enhance
112
For example, some
maritime surveillance in the claimed areas.
claimants have conducted live-fire drills in disputed waters resulting in
113
escalated tensions. “Incidents at sea involving clashes between vessels
of the different . . . [states] have become regular occurrences in the South
China Sea.”114
China has sought to enhance its naval forces and increase its
enforcement capacity. China’s fisheries laws and policies—implemented
to deal with depletion of fisheries resources—have also caused concern
in the SCS.115 Specifically, China’s annual fishing ban has been under
constant challenge in the SCS.116 Despite the fact that the annual fishing
ban applies mainly to China’s traditional fishing grounds, it has long
been a problem for its maritime neighbors, particularly Vietnam.117
China and Vietnam share both land and maritime boundaries and
have been engaged in a longstanding dispute over both boundaries.118
The two governments settled their land boundary in 1999, finally putting
to rest a centuries-old border issue.119 “The maritime boundary between
China and Vietnam extends seaward from the termination of the land
112. See generally Duong, supra note 28, at 1173.
113. See US, Vietnam Hold Military Drills in South China Sea, GLOBAL TIMES, June
25, 2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/663217/US-Vietnam-holdmilitary-drills-in-South-China-Sea.aspx.
114. Rajaratnam Sch. of Int’l Studies, Ensuring Safety at Sea: The Southern Ocean and
REVIEW
(Jan.
3,
2010),
the
South
China
Sea,
EURASIA
http://www.eurasiareview.com/03012012-ensuring-safety-at-sea-the-southern-ocean-andthe-south-china-sea-analysis/.
115. China’s fisheries management in the SCS basically follows the same rules as that
of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. Its annual fishing ban has been practiced since
1995 in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea and since 1999 in the northern section (north
of 12ºN) of the SCS. See XUE, supra note 14, at 122-26.
116. Id.
117. See XIA ET AL., supra note 15, 166-71.
118. See Mark J. Valencia & Jon M. Van Dyke, Vietnam's National Interests and the
Law of the Sea, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 217, 217-19 (1994); see also Zou Keyuan,
Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, 30 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 235,
248 (1999).
119. The Sino-Vietnam Land Border Treaty between China and Vietnam was signed in
December 1999 and came into effect in July 2000. See Sino-Vietnam Border Treaties
Equal to Both Countries, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
200201/24/eng20020124_89291.shtml (last updated Jan. 25, 2002).
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border into the Gulf of Tonkin and out to the [SCS].”120 Based on
UNCLOS’s framework, the two governments settled their maritime
boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin on December 25, 2000.121
China and Vietnam are the most vocal in their sovereignty claims
over the SCS archipelagos.122 These competing claims have complicated
their bilateral relations.123 Over the years, the two have been involved in
armed disputes, diplomatic disputes, and conflicts involving fishing
vessels and maritime surveillance ships.124 In 2010, six incidents
occurred between China and Vietnam, mostly regarding fishing
vessels.125
China and the Philippines have also maintained a certain level of
conflict, manifesting itself in regard to gas exploration and survey ship
confrontations.126 The Reed Bank Incident serves as a good example.
The Reed Bank is part of the KIG and is claimed by both China and
Vietnam. On March 2, 2011, two Chinese patrol vessels approached a
Philippine survey ship conducting a seismic survey near Reed Bank and
ordered it to cease its activities because the area was under Chinese
jurisdiction.127 In response, the Philippine military deployed a warplane
and two coastguard vessels to escort the survey ship “until its survey
128
activities had been completed.”
Following the incident, the Philippines undertook a number of
measures including strengthening the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) presence in the Spratlys, conducting unilateral actions to enhance
its claim in the SCS, and protesting China’s sovereignty claims in the
120. Guifang Xue, Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement for the Gulf of Tonkin, 21
INT’L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 217, 218 (2005).
121. See generally Zou Keyuan, The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime
Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, 36 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 13 (2005).
122. See generally J. Li, The Boundary Dispute Between China and France and the
Boundary Delimitation for the Gulf of Tonkin, in STUDIES ON ISSUES OF THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA 76-89 (2000); J. Li, Disputes Over the Islands and Boundary of the South China Sea
and International Sea Laws, in South China Sea Studies and DEVELOPMENT 3-4 (1998).
123. See generally Hungdah Chiu & Choon-ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and
Spratly Islands, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROBLEMS FROM THE EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE
456 (Choo-ho Park & Jae Kyu Park eds., 1987).
124. See Keyuan, supra note, 121, at 14.
125. Carlyle A. Thayer, Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Grounds for
Cautious Optimism?, RSIS WORKING PAPER, Dec. 14, 2010, at 24-25.
126. Edward Wong, Beijing Warns U.S. About South China Seas Disputes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23china.html.
127. Ian Storey, China and the Philippines: Implications of the Reed Bank Incident,
CHINA BRIEF, May 6, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews
[tt_news]=37902.
128. Id.

322

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:2

129
The Philippines also strengthened its air force presence in the
SCS.
KIG by upgrading its military airfield, observation planes, and vessels to
130
In May 2011, the Philippines removed China’s
escort survey ships.
markers and construction material from Boxhall Reef, Amy Douglas
131
Additionally, Philippine lawmakers visited
Bank, and Reed Bank.
Pagasa (Hope) Island, the largest Filipino-occupied feature in the SCS on
July 20, 2011. There, they pledged funds to improve the islet’s
infrastructure, including allocations for a water purification system, a
cold storage facility, harbor and pier improvements, and runway
improvements.132
China has responded to some of these unilateral actions, as well as to
live-fire military exercises, by stating that they will impair bilateral
ties.133 China has also called on other parties to stop exploiting resources
Nevertheless, some
in areas where China claims sovereignty.134
claimants have strengthened ties with non-regional states, particularly
with the U.S.135
Recognizing the growing military and economic importance of the
SCS, the United States has been paying greater attention to the region.
On July 23, 2010, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, made a
spoke at the seventeenth Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Regional Forum, expressing the U.S.’ views on its “national interest” in
freedom of navigation (FON) and continued open access to the SCS.136
This event marked a turning point concerning the SCS, reframing the
issues from hypothetical discussions on whether it is one of China’s
“core interests” into a diplomatic subject matter for the Asian-Pacific
137
region.
The United States has supported the operations of FON rights in the
international waters and air space of the SCS.138 However, the United

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Dona Z. Pazzibugan, Philippines Pulls Spratlys “Foreign” Posts, INQUIRER
NEWS, June 16, 2011, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/15230/philippines-pulls-spratlysforeign-posts.
132. Storey, supra note 127.
133. Julie M. Aurelio, US Not Coming to Philippines' Aid vs China, ASIAN NEWS
NETWORK, June 12, 2011, http://ph.news.yahoo.com/us-not-coming-philippines-aid-vschina-052002211.html.
134. Julie M. Aurelio, China to Neighbors: Keep Out of Spratly, INQUIRER NEWS, June
10, 2011, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/13613/china-to-neighbors-keep-out-of-spratlys.
135. Id.
136. Thayer, supra note 125, at 13.
137. See id. at 2-6 (discussing China’s “core interests”).
138. See, e.g., S. Res. 217, 112th Cong. (2011).
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States believes that FON is much broader than transiting the waters, and
includes other lawful uses of the sea, such as military activities, counter139
piracy operations, and counter-proliferation operations.
Regarding military activities, UNCLOS does not clearly provide for
140
The United
military uses by non-coastal states in another state’s EEZ.
States holds the position that UNCLOS in no way limits military
activities in the EEZ, so long as they are compatible with the reservation
of the seas for peaceful purposes.141 As a result, several serious
incidents involving U.S. air and naval reconnaissance in China’s EEZ
have occurred, such as the Impeccable Incident on March 9, 2009, which
have strained bilateral relations and affected China’s SCS claim.142
Concerning EEZ enforcement, China recently adopted domestic
measures to control the activities of other states in its EEZ, resulting in
some debate about these measures’ legality.143 According to UNCLOS,
EEZs are areas of shared rights and responsibilities between coastal
states and foreign states.144 China holds the view that a coastal state is
entitled to control its EEZ, as provided by UNCLOS.145 The EEZ is a
special regime, and referred to as neither a territorial sea nor a high
sea.146 Further, China considers the EEZ to serve as a buffer zone for
defense.147 The EEZ is a relatively new regime in international law, and

139. See, e.g., Raul Pedrozo, Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,
62 NAVAL WAR COL. REV. 101, 108 (2009).
140. See generally 5 CTR. FOR OCEANS LAW & POL’Y, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 153-54 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds.,
1989).
141. Id. at 89. See also UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 301, at 516.
142. See generally Pedrozo, supra note 139, at 101.
143. See Mark J. Valencia, Summary of the Bali Dialogue, 28 MARINE POL’Y 7, 12
(2004).
144. See UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 58. at 419.
145. China is of the view that the use of the EEZ for non-peaceful purposes such as
military and electronic intelligence gathering is illegal. See Cheng Xizhong, A Chinese
Perspective on 'Operational Modalities', 28 MARINE POL’Y 25, 27 (2004). See also id.
146. See U.N, THE LAW OF THE SEA: NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON THE EXCLUSIVE
ECONOMIC ZONE, THE ECONOMIC ZONE AND THE EXCLUSIVE FISHERY ZONE 13 (1986)
(“[The] EEZ is subject to a ‘special regime.’ The regime is specific in the sense that the
legal regime of the EEZ is different from both the territorial sea and the high seas. It is a
zone which partakes of some of the characteristics of both regime but belong to
neither.”).
147. JOSEPH R. MORGAN, The REGIME OF THE YELLOW SEA-ISSUES AND POLICY
OPTIONS FOR COOPERATION IN THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 61 (1990).
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the precise nature and scope of a nation’s rights and responsibilities
within an EEZ are still evolving.148
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA: THE NEED TO BRING ITS CLAIM INTO
CONFORMITY WITH UNCLOS
While SCS disputes intensify, some legal and political issues have
been raised in current discussions. There is heightened interest in
China’s theory and practice of international law, and inquiries have been
assembled about legal principles for China to sustain its claims over
islands, adjacent waters, seabed, and subsoil in the SCS.149 China has
been under mounting pressure to define its claims.150
A. Clarifying Claims within the U-shaped Line
China’s U-Shaped Line is composed of nine dashes and extends to
the southern part of the SCS.151 It generally follows a median-line
pattern adjacent to the shores of Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei,
and the Philippines.152 The original version of the U-Shaped Line first
appeared in a Chinese map in 1914, drawn by Chinese cartographer Hu
153
Jin Jie. This version of the line was officially confirmed by China in
154
1947.
It was composed of eleven dashes and titled The Location Map
155
In 1953, China removed two dashes
of the South China Sea Islands.
156
from the Gulf of Tonkin.
Although the U-Shaped Line was on official Chinese maps, China
neither explained the exact legal value of the line nor the status of the
148. For a summary of states’ EEZ legislation and practice, see U.N., THE LAW OF THE
SEA: PRACTICE OF STATES AT THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 9-13 (1994); MARK J. VALENCIA ET AL., THE
REGIME OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: ISSUES AND RESPONSES, A REPORT OF THE
TOKYO MEETING (2003), available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/
stored/pdfs/EEZTokyoMeeting.pdf.
149. See generally SOUTH CHINA SEA, supra note 1.
150. Id.
151. See generally CML/17/2009, supra note 52.
152. CML/18/2009, supra note 52, ¶ 2.
153. Zou Keyuan, The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South
China Sea and Iitsits Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute Over the
Spratly Islands, 14 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 27, 51 (1999).
154. Li Jinming & Li Dexia, The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China
Sea: A Note, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 287, 290 (2003).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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157

In the past decades, the origin and evolution of
waters inside the line.
the U-Shaped Line has been thoroughly examined and mostly agreed
upon,158 but views on the legal status of the U-Shaped Line have been
divided as to its historical waters or title line, territorial border or
159
In recent decades,
maritime boundary line, and island attribution line.
the legislative practice of the Chinese government relating to the Ushaped line and SCS archipelagos has been somewhat neglected.160
Nevertheless, China’s fundamental laws in this field have important
implications for China’s sovereignty claims in the SCS, and they merit a
discussion.
China’s first national statement regarding its territorial sea was in its
Declaration of the Government of PRC on Territorial Sea which was
announced on September 4, 1958 (1958 Declaration).161 It was
announced five months after the first United Nations’ Conference on the
Law of the Sea and reflected the general principles of the Geneva
Conventions.162
163
The first
The 1958 Declaration contains four paragraphs.
paragraph declares that a twelve nautical-mile territorial sea surrounds all
Chinese territories including
the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan
and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha
Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha
Islands and all other islands belonging to China which are
separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by high
seas.164

157. One possible explanation could be concern over further complicating the situation
in the region.
158. Yu Jia, On the Law Status of Duanxuxian of South China Sea, in CHINA’S
BORDERLAND HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY STUDIES 112-49 (2005).
159. Jinming & Dexia, supra note 154, at 291-93.
160. Duong, supra note 28, at 1158.
161. See Declaration of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea, in
COLLECTION OF THE SEA LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
197 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter 1958 Declaration].
162. The adoption of some Geneva principles indicates China’s intention to stay within
the broad framework of the Geneva Conventions. See CHOON-HO PARK, EAST ASIA AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA 17 (1983).
163. 1958 Declaration, supra note 161, at 197.
164. Id.
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From this paragraph, it is clear that the Chinese government was
confident about its sovereignty over the four SCS archipelagos, despite
165
their distance from its mainland and being separated by high seas.
The second and third paragraphs establish a straight baseline method
for the territorial sea of China and establish restrictions on foreign
military vessels and aircraft entering its territorial sea and adjacent air
space, noting the relevant laws and regulations of China.166 The fourth
paragraph emphasizes that the principles provided in the second and third
paragraphs also apply to Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu
Islands, the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands,
167
This
the Nansha islands, and all other islands belonging to China.
indicates that straight baseline methods and territorial sea restrictions are
also applicable to the archipelagos of the SCS.
China’s general positions, enunciated in its 1958 Declaration, were
effectively carried out on matters concerning its territorial seas. For
example, in 1992 China’s Congress enacted the Law on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone,168 which maintained the principles of the
1958 Declaration.169 Article two of this law specifies that China’s land
territory includes “the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha
170
By specifically mentioning the
Islands and the Nansha Islands.”
names of these SCS islands, China has once again confirmed its
sovereignty over these archipelagos. The Law on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone also sets forth China’s twelve nautical mile

165. It is worth mentioning that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam filed an official
note signed by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on September 14, 1958, and agreed to the
terms of China's 1958 Declaration concerning China's territorial sea claim in the East Sea
(SCS). But cf., Vietnam Recognizes Prime Minister Pham Van Dong’s Diplomatic Note
as a Political Declaration and Recognizes the Legality and Legitimacy of Republic of
South Vietnam (2012), available at http://www.eyedrd.org/2011/07/vietnam-recognizesprime-minister-pham-van-dongs-diplomatic-note-as-a-political-declaration-andrecognizes-the-legality-and-legitimacy-of-republic-of-south-vietnam.html.
166. 1958 Declaration, supra note 161, at 197.
167. Id.
168. For the Chinese and English Version, see Liyu Wang & Peter H. Pearse, The New
Legal Regime for China's Territorial Sea, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 431, 434 (1994);
Max Herriman, China's Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone Law and International
Law of the Sea, 92 MARITIME STUDIES 15, 15-19 (1997); Yann-Huei Song & Zou
Keyuan, Maritime Legislation of Mainland China and Taiwan: Developments,
Comparison, Implications, and Potential Challenges for the United States, 31 OCEAN
DEV. & INT’L L. 303, 306-08 (2000).
169. See Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/tsatcz392/ (last visited on Apr. 8, 2012).
170. Id. art. 2.
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territorial sea and twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone measured
by straight baselines.171
In May 1996, upon ratifying UNCLOS, China declared two sets of
baseline coordinates—one set for its mainland and one set for the
Paracels.172 The baselines for the mainland consist of a series of straight
lines linking forty-nine coordinates surrounding its mainland.173 The
baselines for the Paracels consist of a series of straight lines linking
twenty-eight coordinates.174 China’s declaration of coordinates marked a
concrete step in its exercise of sovereignty over the SCS archipelagos
and brought an end to most of the uncertainty surrounding China’s
territorial sea baseline. However, some uncertainty remains due to the
1996 announcement expressly stating that the remaining baselines will
be announced at some unspecified future time.175
China established its EEZ and continental shelf in 1998 by enacting
the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf.176
Although this law does not expressly refer to the SCS archipelagos, two
note verbales clarified the U-Shaped Line includes “sovereignty over the
islands in the South China Seas and the adjacent waters” and “sovereign
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and
subsoil.”177 Note CML/8/2011, dated April 14, 2011, further spelled out
China’s right to maritime zones generated by the Spratlys Islands—
specifically, a territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental
shelf.178 These diplomatic notes marked the first times China included a
map in its official communication to the United Nations.179 By virtue of
these notes, China has officially declared to the world its claims within
the U-Shaped Line.

171. The 1992 Law reaffirms the twelve nautical mile breadth of its territorial sea,
straight baselines, prior approval of foreign military vessels, and sovereignty over
China’s archipelagos and islands claimed in the 1958 Declaration. See id. arts. 2, 3, 6.
172. Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea (May 15, 1996), http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/CHN_1996_Declaration.pdf.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 26, 1998, effective June 26, 1998)
(China)
[hereinafter
Law
on
the
EEZ
and
CS],
available
at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/lotprocoteezatcs790.
177. See generally CML/18/2009, supra note 52; CML/17/2009, supra note 52.
178. See generally CML/8/2011, supra note 95.
179. See generally CML/18/2009, supra note 52.
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B. Determining the Legal Status of the Waters in the U-shaped Line
Having clarified its claimed sovereignty over the islands of the SCS,
China must provide further notice to the international community by
delimiting the specific maritime zones within the U-Shaped Line. As it
stands, it is unclear whether China is claiming the bounded waters as
internal waters, territorial sea, EEZ, continental shelf, or as some other
status with its own unique features. This Section attempts to provide a
preliminary assessment of the legal status of the waters in the U-Shaped
Line.
First, the waters in the U-Shaped Line cannot be internal waters.
Internal waters require full sovereignty and prescriptive control, yet the
Chinese government has never interfered with non-Chinese ships sailing
through these waters.180 In addition, the U-Shaped Line has been
marked with unresolved boundary symbols, which are less fixed than a
land border.
Second, the waters contained within the U-shaped Line are not part
of China’s territorial sea. China’s 1958 Declaration set forth a twelve
nautical mile territorial sea with straight baselines, applying to all of
China’s territories—including the SCS islands.181 Therefore, the
territorial sea of China is the belt of water extending up to twelve
nautical miles as measured from the baselines of the SCS islands. The
majority of the water in the U-Shaped Line, however, lies beyond twelve
nautical miles. Consequently, the majority of the water within the UShaped Line is not a part of China’s territorial sea.
Third, the waters in the U-Shaped Line do not constitute high seas.
If the waters beyond the twelve mile territorial sea measured from the
baselines of the SCS islands, why did the Chinese government undertake
a series of legal procedures and make pronouncements to the world? The
U-shaped Line was drawn to roughly follow the median line between the
coasts of adjacent states, indicating a specified scope of China’s
jurisdictional boundary in the SCS. Thus, the waters in the U-shaped
Line can not constitute high seas.
Lastly, should the water inside the U-shaped Line be considered
some other maritime zone? The only other possibilities under UNCLOS

180. Nong Hong, US-China Perception Gap on Messy South China Sea Dispute:
Assessment of Post-2009 Developments, US CHINA FOCUS.COM (Sept. 22, 2011),
www.chinausfocus.com/slider/u-s-china-perception-gap-on-the-messy-south-china-seadispute-assessment-of-post-2009-developments.
181. 1958 Declaration, supra note 156, at 197.
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are archipelagic waters, contiguous zone, EEZ, or continental shelf.
These waters certainly should not be considered archipelagic waters.
Existing primarily on continental mainland, China has never claimed
archipelagic status. Additionally, the waters within the U-Shaped Line
should not be considered a contiguous zone, EEZ, or continental shelf
because China has not yet determined any territorial sea baseline
coordinates for islands other than the Paracels. Indeed, no established
maritime zone is a good fit for the waters within the U-shaped Line of
the SCS; these waters bear unique status attached with historical
features.183
China’s claim within the U-Shaped Line is often described as
“historical sovereignty” and its legitimacy has been questioned against
modern law of the sea.184 If this description refers to the waters inside
the line, the misconception might have originated from China‘s
statement that “[n]o provisions of [the 1998 EEZ and Continental Shelf
Law l]aw can prejudice [the] historical rights” that China enjoys.185
However, this statement does not specify what provisions might affect
China’s historical rights, and it is not clear what “historical rights” the
law references.186 Arguably, historical rights referred to are the waters
within the U-Shaped Line.187
UNCLOS recognizes historic title or historic waters in articles 10(6),
15, and 46(b), but does not define them.188 Commentators have
observed that the UNCLOS regime for such waters is to be determined
“in accordance with customary international law.”189 In the SCS,
China’s history of occupation, natural resource exploitation, and
administrative control of the SCS archipelagos has its earliest recordings
182. UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 46, at 414.
183. Zou Keyuan, Historic Rights in International Law and in China's Practice, 32
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 149, 160 (2001) (explaining that China’s claim “may . . . be
called historic rights with tempered sovereignty”). See also Li & Li, supra note 154, at
292-93 (discussing “historical rights”).
184. Brice M. Claget, Completing Claims of Vietnam and China in the Vanguard Bank
and Blue Dragon Areas of the SCS, 13 J. OIL & GAS L. & TAXATION REV. 10, 10-11
(1995).
185. Law on the EEZ and CS, supra note 176, art. 14 (emphasis added).
186. See id.; Keyuan, supra note 186, at 149-68 (providing a comprehensive discussion
on how there was no explanation of this provision during the legislative process).
187. See AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 206-10.
188. UNCLOS, supra note 26, arts. 10(6), 15, & 46(b), at 402, 403, 414; Alex G. Oude
Elferink, The Islands in the South China Sea: How Does Their Presence Limit the Extent
of the High Seas and the Area and the Maritime Zones of the Mainland Coasts?, 32
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 169, 172 (2001).
189. Id.
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Since the Song Dynasty, China has exercised
in the Han Dynasty.
authority over the waters—albeit with some interruptions. Moreover,
China has demonstrated its political will to retain authority over the
islands through diplomatic and military means.
The waters in the U-Shaped Line have a unique status given
historical characteristics and traditional rights. Accordingly, these
considerations justify different management. Although China did not
mention “historic rights” or “historic waters” in its note verbales, the
specific status of the waters in the U-Shaped Line needs to be determined
in accordance with recognized principles of international law and state
practice. China’s foremost task is to comply with UNCLOS by issuing
maps or geographic coordinates setting out the limits of the maritime
zones (territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, and continental shelves)
for the features in the SCS, as it did with the Paracels.
Regarding the entitlement of islands or rocks to maritime zones, it is
important to note that the majority of the SCS insular features are reefs
and, thus, are subject to questions of whether these features are capable
of or entitled to generate maritime zones on their own, such as an EEZ or
continental shelf. Once the maritime status of these islands and rocks are
defined, appropriate maritime zones may be delimited. If overlapping
boundaries between China and other claimants result, then issues of
resource exploitation and joint development may be properly negotiated.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS: UNCLOS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
There are numerous disputes in the SCS, and the situation has
become increasingly complex.
Considerable disagreement exists
between China and its maritime neighbors over questions of fact and law.
Additionally, the involvement of non-regional states has only increased
the level of complexity in the SCS.
As the largest state bordering the SCS and a core party to the dispute,
China’s territorial sovereignty and integrity to Spratlys Islands has been
seriously affected. Yet, there are lessons for China to take away from the
disputes. Over the years, China’s lack of concrete action in clarifying its
claims in the SCS has created a very politically troublesome situation.
China has not only missed opportunities in enhancing its control of the
Spratlys, but also faced the challenge to gain support from the

190. ZHENHUA HAN, COLLECTIONS OF HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATIONS
CHINA SEA ISLANDS OF CHINA 15-22 (1988).
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191
China must take
international community for its sovereignty.
effective steps to protect its national interests and secure its sovereignty
192
claim.
To achieve its desired protection, it is important that China clarify its
SCS claims in a manner consistent with UNCLOS. UNCLOS is not a
magic document that will swiftly resolve all the problems encountered by
the states, and it does not provide readily available answers that will
immediately settle the SCS disputed claims; however, it does provide
useful guidelines for states seeking a solution.

191. Zheng Yongnian, How Can China Change Its Difficult Position in the South
China Sea Issue?, DEFENCE TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, at 20.
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